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Abstract: The business of international trade has never been identified as zero-sum. Yet, dependence
on regional agreements to provide alternate means for countries to overlook shortcomings persists.
China’s recent rise up the trade value-chain has fostered an assumption that the regional agreement
provides various advantages to exports from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
member countries. This paper provides an empirical assessment of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
(ACFTA) impact on ASEAN export efficiency into the Chinese market, in pre and post eras. Using a
structured gravity approach to estimate potential export pattern at aggregate and industry level, this
research indicates that though not consistent across years, the ACFTA offers improvements to ASEAN
exports to China. No clear effects of the ACFTA can be extrapolated from the years surrounding the
initial signing (Article 8—2004). However, following its full enactment (2010), the ACFTA resulted in
more sustainable trade from ASEAN members towards China, at both the industry and country levels.
While seeing improvements in export efficiency during its era, ACFTA’s facilitation of efficiency
measures with China came at no expense to other major export destinations.
Keywords: ASEAN; ACFTA; structured gravity model; export efficiency
1. Introduction
Closeness in proximity (referring to the sharing of land, maritime borders, and the similarities in
culture and long-standing economic exchanges) creates limitations for countries to capitalize on the
otherwise comparative or location advantages; i.e., when trading partners comprise the same region.
As in the ASEAN-China regional association (founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand, principally to coordinate security policy during the Cold War, Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was significantly enlarged in the 1990s by the joining of low-income
countries Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. At a critical time of the Asian financial crisis
(1997–1998), China and ASEAN forged a closer relationship. The two parties subsequently launched
a currency swap initiative (the Chiang-Mai Initiative) and began negotiations on an ASEAN-China
Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which entered into force in 2010), advantages in trade are likely held by the
country which possesses the greater number of other competitive elements—access to natural resources
that are restricted to competitors, highly skilled labor, access to new or proprietary technology, etc.
(Zhang & Ow [1], Qin et al. [2], and Que et al. [3] report that the diversity between China and the
ASEAN countries in terms of economic size, system and development strategy at country level is both
a “pushing” force to stimulating the development of bilateral trade relations between these economies
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and also a “resisting” force to limiting the trade expansion. The implementation of the Belt and Road
initiative will offer opportunities for new complementarities and further reshape the patterns of trade,
investment and infrastructure development in the region). In an environment of such homogeneous
nature, it is expected that any gains resulting from comparative advantages, i.e., the production of
an item more proficiently than another nation, are expected to be suppressed. Thereby fostering
unsustainable long-term patterns of trade and suppressing the structural enhancement within the
export sector of the disadvantaged country. Albeit, the formation of regional agreements can provide
alternate means for countries to overlook these shortcomings to reach climatic levels of trade. Thus,
the country which possesses these elements are likely to reap greater and more sustainable gains
from trade.
Over the past decade, studies have attempted to explain the transitional changes in ASEAN trade
with the Chinese economy, following the signing of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA)
(the framework agreement of the ACFTA was signed in November 2002, and the ACFTA was created
in January 2010 aiming to build a strong economic partnership between ASEAN and China. In August
2014, ASEAN and China decided to upgrade the ACFTA). Assertions have been made that China
possesses a direct influence on the export flows from amongst the ASEAN member countries. In 2004,
Lall and Albaladejo [4] posited that, due to its climb up the global value chain, China will command
the activities that have driven export growth thereby becoming a threat to East Asian economies.
Yet, Devadason [5] finds no supporting evidence that China has significantly affected the trade.
The author, however, argues that while connections to China provide a better path for the growth of
trade, ASEAN members are expected to remain relevant despite the ascendance of their larger Asian
neighbor. This does not negate earlier findings, which suggest that ASEAN will likely face significant
competition from Chinese suppliers within the durable product industries [4,6]. Furthermore, Park [7]
alluded to evidence which suggests the significance and perseverance of an Asian exporter network
to China is likely to persist. Arguably, the growth in China’s exports accelerated the exports of
neighboring economies [8].
The purpose of this study is not to challenge or validate the comparative nominal growth in
exports but to assess the sustainability of ASEAN exports into China since the implementation of the
ACFTA from an export efficiency perspective by employing a stochastic gravity model framework. We
define export efficiency as the gap between actual and potential export flow for each observation by
following the popular idea of technical efficiency in production economics. According to Jomit [9],
the potential export is the estimated maximum value of exports that may be attained using the most
efficient trade policies observed (This definition offers no indication as to a country’s trade balance.
Jomit’s efficiency is measured by the most optimal exports levels given existing conditions unadjusted).
Given the importance of international trade in the economic development, it is critical for a nation to
assess its export efficiency and potential for export growth in order to stress maximizing the potential
gains from sustainable trade. This study will not only provide an enriched understanding of ASEAN’s
efficiency performance and export pattern changes to China, but also suggest some policy measures to
improve efficiency. In particular, this study addresses the question about if the ACFTA has resulted in
an improvement in the efficiency performance of ASEAN exports to China.
Prior to and post the complete implementation of ACFTA, various studies have been conducted
regarding its impact on the imports and exports of the member countries. Using various techniques of
analysis—Computable General Equilibrium (CGE), Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), various
trade and welfare indices, and the Gravity model—the bulk of studies conclude that both trade creation
and diversion effects are impacts of the ACFTA [10–13]. The benefits of ACFTA are exclusive to
member countries; however, whether from the perspective of either side of the border or a particular
sector, both challenges and complementing factors are likely [14].
Previous studies also point to the potential increase in trade consequential to the ACPTA, albeit
at the expense of trade with external trade partners [5]. However, this research begins with the
unfamiliarity of previous research which sought to measure the efficiency of exports level with regards
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to benchmark potentials, ceteris paribus. Under the ACFTA, earlier work of Tongzon [15] suggests that
the provision of preferential market access helps the effectiveness of ASEAN exports to China when
competing with developed countries in industries where China lacks a comparative advantage. Such
unilateral/biased access to markets can lead to unsustainable long-run expectations. Can that be the
region’s outlook following ACFTA?
Not denying any positive economic impact from the FTA through exploits of economies of scale
to some ASEAN member-states, Aslam [16] skeptically questions the size of the gains, contending
that ACFTA does not ensure total gains to members and acknowledging that such trade gains arise
can be derived under perfect competition (the traditional trade approach to regional integration
assumes perfect competition in markets, which focuses on the implications of forming a region for a
static allocation of resources) due to the re-allocation of domestic resources in line with a country’s
comparative advantage. In a group of countries with similar structures of production and exports,
only countries with lower production cost will gain from trade; leading to an ultimate reduction in
real export revenue in countries with lesser advantages [16]. Recent studies on market integration,
which allow for imperfect competition (in imperfectly competitive markets, where firms can set
prices, there may be collective gains if regional integration makes it possible to shift rents away from
nonmember countries. These rents exist if firms can exercise market power and price above marginal
cost. Forming a regional agreements increases the amount of competition in the market and this affects
all firms that will find their ability to extract these rents eroded. Not only market power but also
bargaining power can be increased by forming a regional trade agreements), economies of scale, and
product differentiation, argue the pro-competitive effects of larger markets rather than comparative
advantage [17]. The business of international trade has never been identified as zero-sum. However,
maximizing gains while reducing costs incurred will always be the benchmark in measuring the
worthiness of any agreement to parties involved.
This study contributes to the literature in two main facets: by estimating untapped export potential
shares of ASEAN suppliers in the Chinese market, and making rational comparisons between actual
and potential export shares, in pre and post ACFTA eras, deepening the insight into ASEAN gains
or limitations from the ACFTA. The paper utilizes data between 2000 and 2018, which provides a
complete scenario of ASEAN’s integrated free trade association with China.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the ASEAN-China
exports relation. This is followed by a detailed description of the analytical methodology in Section 3.
Empirical findings are discussed in Section 4, with rational conclusions in the final Section 5.
2. Export Performances
Economists continue to write extensively on the significance of exports to economic development.
Following an analysis of low and middle developing countries, Kavoussi [18] revealed a strongly
positive correlated effect between high economic growth and high rates of growing exports. However,
the author also alluded to a likely diminishing impact according to the countries’ state of development.
The study by Tingwall and Ljungwall [19] supports the view, with empirical evidence from an export-led
growth hypothesis, that exports contribute more to China’s economic growth than in other countries.
Therefore, this section provides a critical analysis of ASEAN’s export performance, particularly to
China, and its significance to development.
Despite individual differences, trade represents an integral component to the development and
growth of ASEAN economies, as shown in Table 1. In one-half of the region’s members, trade
exceeds 100% of the country’s GDP, led by Singapore (326.2%) by 2018. Notably, in that year’s list
of ASEAN extra-regional trade partners, China surpasses all others. USA, Japan, Hong Kong, and
then Korea completed the top five individual countries. Evidence of the region’s significant growth
with China compared with individual countries is illustrated in Figure 1. After 2004, hyper-growth
in trade with China was later dampened at the height of the 2008 crisis—a worldwide phenomenon.
This represented a time where the regions excelled in price competition. Yet, this trade relationship
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immediately rebounded to an upward trajectory a year later. The growth in exports beyond China
displays no significant adverse impacts, providing preliminary insights into the sustainability of an
ASEAN-China enhanced trade relationship. This is also contrary to previous assumptions that exports
of all Asian economies are dependent on strong global growth.
Table 1. ASEAN Trade as % of GDP and Growth rate.
ASEAN Members
GDP Growth (%) Trade (% of GDP)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Brunei Darussalam 2.8 0.4 2.6 −0.6 0.1 103.2 97.5 95.4 84.9 93.9
Cambodia 10.7 13.3 6.0 7.0 7.5 110.9 136.8 113.6 127.9 124.9
Indonesia 4.9 5.7 6.2 4.9 5.2 71.4 64.0 46.7 41.9 43.0
Lao PDR 5.8 7.1 8.5 7.3 6.2 68.8 71.8 84.7 85.8 -
Malaysia 8.9 5.3 7.4 5.1 4.7 220.4 203.9 157.9 131.4 130.5
Myanmar 13.7 13.6 9.6 7.0 6.2 1.2 0.3 34.7 47.4 -
Philippines 4.4 4.8 7.6 6.1 6.2 104.7 97.9 71.4 62.7 76.1
Singapore 9.0 7.4 14.5 2.9 3.1 364.4 420.4 369.7 329.5 326.2
Thailand 4.5 4.2 7.5 3.1 4.1 121.3 137.9 127.3 125.9 123.3
Vietnam 6.8 7.5 6.4 6.7 7.1 111.4 130.7 152.2 178.8 208.3
Source: The World Bank Online Databank—May 2020.
Figure 1. ASEAN Export Flow to Top 5 Destinations (2000–2018).
In 2000, the total value of commodity imports and exports between China and ASEAN was USD
36.2 billion, which ranked fifth in China’s trade-values with major trading partners. According to
CEPII, China’s total value of imports from, and exports to, ASEAN stood at USD 531.6 billion. This
followed significant annual growth during the periods 2002 to 2007, 2010, and 2011. These figures hint
that the sustainable strength between these free trade members continues to increase, which could
potentially be a result of the ACFTA. In 2018, China stood as ASEAN’s largest trading partner (for both
imports and export—see Figure 2) following the region’s domestic trade while ASEAN was China’s
third-largest trading partner, behind the USA and the 28-member EU collective.
During the period 2000 to 2018, ASEAN exports to China increased exponentially year by year, up
from USD 17.6 billion to USD 214.7 billion. The largest growth was recorded in 2010, an increase of
46.7% over the previous year; an increase similar to 44.8% recorded in 2000. An effect of the global
financial crisis resulted in declined exports in 2009 by 6.9% (USD5.8 billion less), to Chinese consumers.
In 2010, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area fully enactment deadline, ASEAN’s exports to its partner
rebounded with USD 114.9 billion, followed by a subsequent increase of 23.9% in 2011. Though with
more modest rates, ASEAN export growth to China continued on an upward trajectory, and was
a strong reminder of ASEAN’s importance as an exporter to China. From an import perspective,
Sustainability 2020, 12, 6159 5 of 26
similar growth trends were exhibited (see Table 2). The value of imports originating from the Chinese
mainland grew from USD 18.6 billion in 2000 to reach USD 316.8 billion in 2018; 47.5% larger than
total exports.
Table 2. ASEAN Member-States Exports to China and the World (2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2018).
1 Exports to World (US$B) 2 Exports to China (US$B) Share of Exports to China (%)
2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Brunei
Darussalam 3.9 6.2 8.9 6.4 6.6 0.06 0.19 0.60 0.09 0.24 1.4 3.0 6.8 1.5 3.7
Cambodia 1.4 3.1 5.1 8.5 12.7 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.71 1.35 4.4 1.2 2.6 8.3 10.7
Indonesia 65.4 87.0 157.8 150.4 180.2 3.24 7.13 16.50 16.10 28.10 4.9 8.2 10.5 10.7 15.6
Lao PDR 0.3 0.6 1.7 3.7 5.3 0.00 0.01 0.73 1.45 1.61 0.7 2.5 41.6 39.8 30.4
Malaysia 98.2 141.6 198.6 200.0 247.5 3.13 9.61 26.40 27.90 36.10 3.2 6.8 13.3 14.0 14.6
Myanmar 1.6 3.8 8.7 11.4 16.7 0.04 0.07 0.77 4.64 4.93 2.7 2.0 8.9 40.6 29.6
Philippines 38.1 41.3 51.5 58.8 69.3 1.09 7.52 8.97 10.90 13.30 2.9 18.2 17.4 18.5 19.2
Singapore 137.8 229.6 351.9 351.6 413.0 5.31 16.80 32.10 43.20 44.30 3.8 7.3 9.1 12.3 10.7
Thailand 69.0 110.9 193.3 214.3 253.0 3.16 9.34 22.00 24.50 31.00 4.6 8.4 11.4 11.4 12.3
Vietnam 14.5 32.4 72.2 162.1 243.7 1.51 2.78 6.67 16.50 53.80 10.4 8.6 9.2 10.2 22.1
Source: 1 The World Bank Online Databank—May 2020. 2 CEPII Online Database—May 2020.
Exports originating from ASEAN member states have all grown exponentially, both towards
China and the rest of the world. However, the growth in demand by the Chinese economy surpassed
that of the rest of the world. In 2018, China’s share of each member nation’s export expanded at least
2.5 times when compared with 2000, excluding Vietnam. Prior to and following the ACFTA, Vietnam
maintained a high dependence on the Chinese consumer for its export revenue (see Table 3).
Table 3. Model variables.
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
trdValue—bilateral export value (US$ exports) 7,326,504 23323.76 458626.6 0 1.55 × 108
lntrdValue—trdValue in natural log form (used in
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique) 7,326,504 4.568809 3.496805 0 18.86088
lnDistance—geographical distance trading countries
(i and j), in kilometers 7,180,409 8.695605 0.8054378 4.107106 9.894045
dContig—trading countries (i and j) are contiguous 7,180,409 0.0315982 0.1749279 0 1
dLang—trading countries (i and j) share a common
official language 7,180,409 0.1659112 0.3720009 0 1
dColony—trading countries (i and j) ever had a
colonial link 7,180,409 0.0471064 0.2118664 0 1
dComcol—are currently in a colonial relationship 7,180,409 0.0575785 0.2329446 0 1
* dOFTA—country i possess a Free Trade
relationship with country j, exclusive to the ACFTA 7,326,504 0.0104268 0.101578 0 1
* dACFTA—ASEAN country and China free trade
agreement—ACFTA from year of signature 7,326,504 0.000243 0.0155851 0 1
dACFTA_after2010—ASEAN and China trade
agreement after full enactment year of 2010 7,326,504 0.0019776 0.0444264 0 1
* dPSA—country i possess a Preferential System of
Trade relationship with country j 7,326,504 0.0062267 0.0786634 0 1
*—Variable lagged for 5 consecutive one-year periods.
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Figure 2. ASEAN Import and Exports with China (2000–2018), USD.
3. Method of Analysis
3.1. Gravity Model
The gravity model continues to build and maintain a long history of evaluating bilateral trade
patterns between geographical locations [20–22]. It was the work of Tinbergen that pioneered a series
of applications in the early 1960s [23]. The original gravity model takes the form:
Tradeij = α
Y
β1
ı Y
β2
j
Distβ3ij
 (1)
where i denotes the exporter, and j, the importer. The variable Tradeij represents the volumes of
bilateral trade flows, that is, the sum of exports and imports between partners i and j: α is the
proportionality constant term. Dij represents the geographical distance between partners i and j.
Despite its frontier approach, this initial form of the model lacked a convincing microeconomic
foundation. It was work by Anderson [24] that filled the void regarding microeconomic theory. The
author provided quantitative support to gravity model by applying the Cobb-Douglas production
function and Constant Elasticity Substitution, under the assumption that products are differentiated
by region, known as the ‘Armington Assumption’ [25,26]. Ignoring price discrimination, Anderson
explained that the share that country j expenditure on exports from i, φi, is equal for all j (i.e., Ei varies
only with φi). Country i’s exports to j:
Tij = φiαjYj (2)
Assuming tradable goods market equilibrium where
φiYi = αj
∑
j
Yj (3)
Thus:
Tij =
Yi φiYjφj∑
i
∑
j Tij
=
Yi φiYjφj∑
j Yjφj
(4)
If Tij is expressed as a function of income and population (and other factors), adding an error term
and a constant, (Equation (4)) is expressed as follows (already a simple variant of the gravity model in
which economic masses determine the trade flows, Anderson, through gradual modification, added
the transportation cost, Tij):
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Tij = C
Yi f(Yi, Ni)Yjf
(
Y, Nj
)
∑
j Yjf
(
Yj, Nj
) εij (5)
Assuming a linear form of f (), and replacing the denominator with Yw (world trade income),
yields:
Tij =
( c
Yw
)
Yβ1i N
β1
i Y
β2
j N
β2
j εij (6)
Following further contributions from Bergstrand [27–29] (Bergstrand [27–29] develops a
relationship between trade theory and bilateral trade, and includes the supply side of the economy
explicitly) to the gravity model, Anderson and van Wincoop [30] has become the main reference for
subsequent work on the gravity (Equation (6)). Here, a simplified derivation of the model outlined by
Baier and Bergstrand [30] will be used to derive the model for this analysis.
Assume a sum of N countries with M varieties of goods. All consumers have identical
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preference:
Uj =
[∑N
i−1 C
σ−1
σ
ij
]σ−1
σ
j = 1, . . . , N (7)
where Uj the utility of consumers in country j, Cij is the good consumed by people in country j imported
from country i, σ is the elasticity of substitution between “varieties”—σ > 1; N is the number of nations.
Note that varieties are defined symmetrically, which allows us to ignore a variety index. Maximizing
utility subject to a budget constraint can derive the demand for the good consumed in country j import
from country i, Tij.
Tij =
(piτij
Pj
)1−σ
Yj (8)
Here, pi is the mill price of a variety of goods in country i (after transportation the price in market
j becomes Pij = piτij), τij is the transportation cost, also referred to as the iceberg trade cost, for good
shipped to country j from i. Yj is country j’s income, and Pj is the price index associated with the CES
demand structure:
Pj =
 N∑
i=1
(
piτij
)(1−σ)
1/(1−σ)
=
 N∑
i=1
pij
(1−σ)

1/(1−σ)
(9)
where Pij represents the price of goods produced in country i and sold in country j. Under the
assumption that all goods are traded, allowing for the total output of country i, Yi, to equal total sales
to all destination countries j (i.e., markets clear), we can write an expression for bilateral trade flow as:
Tij =
(
τij
pijPj
)1−σ(Yi Yj
Yw
)
(10)
pii =
 N∑
j=1
(
θj/τijσ−1
)
Pj1−σ

1/(1−σ)
(11)
Pj =
[∑N
i=1
(
θi/τijσ−1
)
pii
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(12)
Note that θi = Yi/Yw, while pii represents what Anderson and van Wincoop [30] coined as the
“multilateral resistance” term (multilateral resistance variables are crucial to understanding the effects
of border barriers on bilateral trade [30]), which captures the N-body properties of the trade network.
The authors noted that when influence trade is estimated, it is critical to include both inward and
outward multilateral resistances into the regression.
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Converting to a linear form, we get (this measures relationship between trade flow on the left side
and trade cost, multilateral resistance, and GDP on the right side with in some time period):
ln
(
Tij
)
= (1 − σ)
[
ln(τij) − ln(pii) − ln
(
Pj
)]
+ ln(Yi) + ln
(
Yj
)
+ ln(Yw) (13)
When trade incurs across some t periods, (Equation (13)) can be presented as:
ln
(
Tijkt
)
= (1 − σ)
[
ln(τijkt) − ln(piikt) − ln
(
Pjkt
)]
+ ln(Yit) + ln
(
Yjt
)
+ ln(Ywt) (14)
As with preceding gravity (Equations (1)–(14)), trade cost contains both time-invariant variables
and those that vary with time. Including these differentiated variables, fixed effects (both importer-year
and exporter-year) (used to control for unobserved multilateral resistance [31] and ensure the theoretical
restrictions implied by structural gravity, these time-variant fixed effects will absorb the inward/outward
multilateral effects, importer’s GDP, exporter’s GDP, and world GDP. Note that the pair effects absorb
all time-invariant pairs, which are usually found to be correlated with other time-invariant trade cost
and are excluded from the model) and an error term µ, disaggregated at an industry level, we get:
ln
(
Tijkt
)
= βo + β1 ln(Yit) + β2 ln
(
Yjt
)
+ β3 ln
(
dijk
)
+ δ ∗ TAijkt + FEikt + FEjkt + FEijk + µijkt (15)
Here, TAijkt capture bilateral trade agreements, in dichotomous form, that may exist between
countries. FEikt is the exporter-year is fixed effects, FEjkt is the importer-year fixed effect, while
FEijk represents the cross-country pair effects (Anderson and van Wincoop [30] states implicitly that
(Equation (14)) may yield biased estimates without the inclusion of implicit price indexes that are hard
to measure empirically. Feenstra [32] proposes to control for implicit price indexes by exporter and
importer fixed effects and include a parametric control similar to [33]).
3.2. Model Selection
In their recent survey of empirical works, Head and Mayer [34] highlight the economic foundation
in the use of gravity model in a structural form; pointing to improve discoveries on the consequences of
various aspects of trade patterns and development of economies over time. According to the authors,
the enhanced value of the structural form is attributed to the characterization of the distribution across
source-destination pair effects.
The structured gravity model (Equation (16)) used for the first stage in this paper to examine
factors that affect trade exports and estimate exports potential ̂est_ expijkt is therefore inclusive of both
time-variant and pair effects. The specification is as follows:
̂est_ expijkt = αˆ0 +
∑3
h=1
δˆhTAijt−h + FEikt + FEjkt + µijt (16)
The second stage, to uncover the reachable export pace of the ASEAN nations, includes
(Equation (17)). Here the dependent variable is logged only under the OLS estimation technique,
which has been used in this research as a model stability benchmark due to the linear approach:
export efficiency(EE_wA) =
∑
êxpijkt
(actual)
∑
expijkt
(17)
export effeciency(EE_nA) =
̂∑ expijkt−ACFTA
(actual)
∑
expijkt
agreement efficiency effect (AEE) =
̂∑ expijkt−ACFTA∑
êxpijkt
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Export efficiency > 1 implies the existence of export space; thereby possibilities exist for the
expansion of exports, to the Chinese market. A value below 1 is indicative of a trading environment
which has surpassed expectations.
Acknowledging issues of zero trade and heteroscedasticity, if unaccounted could lead to biased
results, and the significant rise in popularity in academic literature [35], this research’s chosen
technique of estimation is Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Structured Panel (unlike
linear estimators, PPML does not assume homoscedasticity and it remains valid under general forms
of heteroscedasticity—dependent variable not logged). However, to add a measure of comparable
stability to the expected coefficients, the OLS operator adopted by Guimaraes and Portugal [36] was
included, using the same underlying specification.
4. Data, Results, and Discussion
4.1. Data
Capturing the lead trading partners of ASEAN, this paper analyses the value of bilateral
exports for 46 countries (Country list includes: ARE-United Arab Emirates; ARG-Argentina;
AUS-Australia; BEL-Belgium; BRA-Brazil; BRN-Brunei Darussalam; CAN-Canada; CHE-Switzerland;
CHL-Chile; CHN-China; COL-Colombia; CRI-Costa Rica; DEU-Germany; ESP-Spain; FRA-France;
GAB-Gabon; GBR-United Kingdom; HKG-Hong Kong; IDN-Indonesia; IND-India; ITA-Italy;
JPN-Japan; KAZ-Kazakhstan, KGZ-Kyrgyzstan; KHM-Cambodia; KOR-Rep. of Korea; LAO-Lao
People’s Dem. Rep.; LBR-Liberia; MEX-Mexico; MMR-Myanmar; MUS-Mauritius; MYS-Malaysia;
NLD-Netherlands; NOR-Norway; NZL-New Zealand; PAK-Pakistan; PAN-Panama; PHL-Philippines;
PRT-Portugal; RUS-Russian Federation; SGP-Singapore; THA-Thailand; USA-USA; UZB-Uzbekistan;
VEN-Venezuela; VNM-Vietnam) over the period 2000–2018; taken from the CEPII online BACI database
(data can be obtained from http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=37). Using
the UN Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS) and disaggregated at the
second level, trade information for 97 industries (Table A1) was assimilated according to the imports
(corresponding exports) of each country for each corresponding partner (i.e., recorded import values of a
partner country will represent the export values of the exporter and vice versa. Notably, the trade values
are inclusive of the Cost, Insurance, and Freight tax, which accounts for some of the cost associated
with international trade) on the list; measured in units of US dollar. Currency inflation will be captured
through the importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects model inclusion. Data used to capture cost
associated with geography, which many authors refer to as traditional trade cost, is also taken from
the CEPII database (data can be obtained from http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp),
while information on recent trade agreements is acquired through the WTO Regional Trade Agreement
database (data can be obtained from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm).
See Table 3 for the full list of variables used in this analysis, with additional descriptive statistics.
Data quality is a significant contributor to any regression’s outcome; yet, the treatment of zero or
missing trade has long been and remains a contentious issue of debate, see Santos Silva and Tenreyro [37].
Haveman and Hummels [38] emphasize the appearance of zero trade is a common phenomenon in
a trade matrix, as the minority of countries trade all products. The level of disaggregation data use
expectedly captures a significant number of missing trade flows (i.e., zeros). Therefore, the authors
propose an estimation technique where missing trade values are assumed to take a value of zero—a
possible compensation for observation error when the flow is very small [29]. Additionally, Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein [39] suggest that zero trade is a practical result when an exporting country is
below necessary productive levels to serve a foreign market.
4.2. Estimate Results
Displayed in Table 4 are the regression results used to project potential exports value between
partnering trading nations. To reduce the possibilities of spurious results, and a measure of robustness
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evaluation, the sampled (in each test the sample size exceed seven million) control variables were
tested across varying model specifications prior to the final approach being selected. Moving from the
parsimonious to the more detailed specification, using the two techniques of analysis and controlling
for time-variant effects, columns one through four contains the results of all preliminary tests. From
the results presented, the level of consistency in variable outcomes in the level of significance and
direction of expected impact ensures the appropriateness of the model selection, primarily through the
estimated control variables. Ultimately, the results confirm that distance, contiguity, common language,
direct colonial relationships past and present, regional agreements, and the impact of external shocks
such like the global crisis are significant to the flow of commodity exports between countries.
Confirmed throughout the model evaluations in columns one to four using both techniques,
the control variables identified as bilateral trade (distance, contiguity, language, and other colonial
relationship variables) and multilateral (regional agreements) cost variables are consistent with that
of previous researchers. However, results from the first PPML regression indicate adverse effects on
commodity exports between a country and its colonial master. However, the opposite is consistent
across all other test and techniques.
It is worthy of note that results confirm that the initial impact of the global financial crisis, which
originated in the West, provided a boost to commodity exports of the sample countries (see Appendix A
for additional regression results). The increase in export flow across the ASEAN region to its leading
destinations during 2008 suggests a measure of rather than a lack of global integration of the region’s
financial systems. Further, the region may be seen as an unconfirmed source haven during a crisis
period, arguably for its known comparatively cheaper products.
The final PPML and preferred estimation model approach extends to further capture existing
country-pair relationships that influence the flow of trade—including both time-variant and invariant
fixed effects. Consistent with World Bank’s [40] research on regional agreements effect on trade, free
trade agreement may ultimately impose negative impacts on the flow of trade exports. Additionally,
where significant, the annual direct impacts of the following regional agreement are as expected.
The multilateral resistance at the industry level are captured Exporter-Industry-Time FE and
Importer-Industry-Time FE. To ensure the robustness of the results, we adopted a second estimation
approach presented in Appendix B.
4.3. Export Potential
In the second stage of the analysis, the export potentials of industries are calculated to assess the
level of deviation, by partnering nations. At the aggregate level, estimates imply very little fluctuation
in export-flows between actual and potential from the ASEAN members into China. Using five
interval years of 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2018, the region’s exports performance remains relatively
efficient with measurement mostly approximating values of 1.0. No clear effects of the ACFTA can be
extrapolated from the years following the initial signing (2004) or the full enactment (2010). Ultimately,
any adjustment to the trade patterns of ASEAN member has been marginal variation from the expected
trade in the absence of the ACFTA. Thus, the agreement itself offers positives to the trade performance
of signatories (see Figure 3 and Table 5). Compared with the values of 2000, the 2018 efficiency exports
of all ASEAN members to China indicated improvements, excluding Brunei. Worthy of note are
the sizeable improvements demonstrated by the Philippines, Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, Malaysia,
and Vietnam under the ACFTA, with the remaining member-countries exhibiting consistent patterns
of efficiency.
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Table 4. Regression Results.
Variables
PPML (Structured) OLS (Robust)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance −0.792 *** −0.793 *** −0.789 *** −1.571 *** −1.565 *** −1.554 ***
(0.00360) (0.00365) −0.0037 (0.000965) (0.000973) (0.000990)
dContiguity 0.700 *** 0.691 *** 0.683 *** 0.492 *** 0.495 *** 0.495 ***
(0.00991) (0.00999) (0.00995) (0.00508) (0.00508) (0.00507)
dLanguage −0.00328 0.00307 0.00685 0.576 *** 0.578 *** 0.583 ***
(0.00970) (0.00982) (0.00985) (0.00215) (0.00215) (0.00215)
dColony 0.155 *** 0.159 *** 0.170 *** 1.348 *** 1.349 *** 1.345 ***
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.00363) (0.00363) (0.00361)
dComColony −0.148 *** −0.152 *** −0.140 *** 0.689 *** 0.686 *** 0.682 ***
(0.0284) (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00347)
dACFTA 0.0941 0.0988 0.0181 −0.123 ** −0.128 ** −0.0789 **
(0.0580) (0.0571) (0.0311) (0.0420) (0.0420) (0.0259)
dACFTA_l1 0.0441 −0.0128 −0.0818 −0.0467
(0.0553) (0.0305) (0.0425) (0.0255)
dACFTA_l2 0.0134 −0.0643 * −0.0760 −0.114 ***
(0.0531) (0.0281) (0.0435) (0.0256)
dACFTA_l3 0.0765 −0.0663 * −0.0813 −0.212 ***
(0.0528) (0.0282) (0.0431) (0.0241)
dACFTA_l4 0.0306 −0.0618 * −0.165 *** −0.215 ***
(0.0536) (0.0250) (0.0434) (0.0249)
dACFTA_l5 −0.0341 −0.0991 *** −0.0709 −0.115 ***
(0.0560) (0.0251) (0.0416) (0.0248)
dACFTAafter2010 −0.0558 ** −0.0601 ** −0.0699 *** −0.246 *** −0.258 *** −0.0984 ***
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0175) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.00957)
dOFTA 0.715 *** 0.526 *** 0.210 *** 0.764 *** 0.635 *** 0.138 ***
(0.0371) (0.0480) (0.0159) (0.00923) (0.0112) (0.00628)
dOFTA_l1 0.357 *** 0.138 *** 0.545 *** 0.109 ***
(0.0472) (0.0158) (0.0122) (0.00702)
dOFTA_l2 0.303 *** 0.0309 * 0.615 *** 0.0679 ***
(0.0441) (0.0137) (0.0112) (0.00653)
dOFTA_l3 0.452 *** 0.0370 * 0.703 *** 0.0919 ***
(0.0622) (0.0173) (0.0144) (0.00821)
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Table 4. Cont.
Variables
PPML (Structured) OLS (Robust)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
dOFTA_l4 0.350 *** 0.0365 0.477 *** 0.0557 ***
(0.0697) (0.0192) (0.0158) (0.00921)
dOFTA_l5 0.238 *** −0.0505 ** 0.462 *** 0.0170
(0.0668) (0.0174) (0.0160) (0.00938)
dPSA −0.430 *** −0.330 *** −0.139 *** −0.495 *** −0.474 *** −0.121 ***
(0.0482) (0.0580) (0.0194) (0.0123) (0.0142) (0.00811)
dPSA_l1 −0.103 −0.0636 ** −0.418 *** −0.0810 ***
(0.0617) (0.0203) (0.0155) (0.00889)
dPSA_l2 −0.0682 0.0406 * −0.509 *** −0.0584 ***
(0.0644) (0.0203) (0.0151) (0.00878)
dPSA_l3 −0.261 *** 0.0502 * −0.716 *** −0.0836 ***
(0.0768) (0.0240) (0.0178) (0.0103)
dPSA_l4 −0.165 * −0.00885 −0.474 *** −0.0396 ***
(0.0757) (0.0231) (0.0190) (0.0113)
dPSA_l5 0.0478 0.0817 *** −0.398 *** −0.0194
(0.0712) (0.0207) (0.0189) (0.0112)
Constant 18.04 *** 17.98 *** 17.88 *** 4.567 ***
(0.00845) (0.00852) (0.00869) (0.000471)
Observations 7,162,146 7,162,146 7,162,146 7,306,539 7,180,409 7,180,409 7,180,409 7,326,504
R-squared 0.869 0.869 0.870 0.988 0.691 0.692 0.692 0.872
Exporter-Industry-Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Importer-Industry-Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Exporter-Importer-Industry FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Figure 3. Results: Individual ASEAN Member Export Efficiency with China (2000, 2005, 2010, 2015,
and 2018).
Figure 4 presents the efficiency patterns of the nine (9) largest exporting industries as of
2018. Ranked by least efficient: 84-Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances;
27-Mineral fuels, mineral oils, and products of their distillation; 15-Animal or vegetable fats and oils,
and their cleavage products; prepared animal fats; 40-Rubber and articles thereof; 26-Ores, slag, ash;
85-Electrical machinery and equipment, and parts thereof; 90-Optical, photo, and cinematographic,
measuring, medical, and surgical instruments; 29-Organic chemicals; 39- Plastics and articles thereof.
By 2018, the efficiency of exports of these industries to China showed improvements, excluding 39-
Plastics and articles thereof and 84-Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and mechanical appliances.
Appendix A provides a comprehensive list of all categorized exports within the sample data. Export
commodities categorized by industries also indicated efficient (or increasingly efficient) exporting
patterns to the Chinese market. Notably by 2018, 65 of the 96 listed industries showed improved
export efficiency as a result of the ACFTA, when compared with an estimate void of an agreement.
These improvements, both at the country-level and industry-level are expected to be beneficial for a
sustainable trade relation between China and ASEAN in the long run.
A more in-depth analysis of individual member states reveals a slightly alternate view in
performance. For most individual member exports, though indicative of fluctuations over time,
deviations from potential level are minimal by 2018; this excludes Brunei Darussalam. Notwithstanding
earlier periods in ASEAN, China trade relations where the country appears in a state of substantial
over-trading with the Chinese economy, export performance remains fluid. The year 2018 was another
significant period in Brunei Darussalam-China exports. Though a better performance relative to the
efficiency of exporting in 2015, the country remains 72% below its potential. The size of commodities
trade between this individual country and China is among the lowest across members, despite the
possibilities for increased gains. It is worthy to acknowledge the continuous improvement displayed
in exports originating from within the Lao People’s Democratic and Myanmar. Similar results are
depicted in Figure 2.
Combined results of this research indicate that though some adjustments to export flows have
been realized in member states, the impact of the ACFTA compared with earlier years offers indicative
improvements to commodity export optimality from within ASEAN towards the Chinese market.
These results do not nullify any increases in nominal value as a consequence of the ACFTA. Yet, signs
show that China’s existing trade relationship with ASEAN fosters an unhampered environment for
commodity exports, contradicting the warnings of some researchers in the context of sustainable
export efficiency.
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Table 5. Results: ASEAN Export Efficiency with China (2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2018).
2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
EE_wA EE_nA AEE EE_wA EE_nA AEE EE_wA EE_nA AEE EE_wA EE_nA AEE EE_wA EE_nA AEE
Brunei
Darussalam 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.54 0.49 0.907 0.48 0.49 1.021 2.71 2.51 0.926 1.72 1.59 0.924
Indonesia 0.78 0.78 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.911 1.05 1.08 1.029 1.06 0.97 0.915 0.92 0.85 0.924
Cambodia 0.46 0.46 1.00 1.62 1.48 0.914 1.08 1.11 1.028 1.13 1.04 0.920 0.85 0.79 0.929
Lao People’s
Dem 4.86 4.86 1.00 3.47 3.17 0.914 0.98 1.01 1.031 0.79 0.73 0.924 0.92 0.85 0.924
Myanmar 2.17 2.17 1.00 4.57 4.17 0.912 1.51 1.56 1.033 0.86 0.80 0.930 1.01 0.93 0.921
Malaysia 1.15 1.15 1.00 1.16 1.06 0.914 0.90 0.93 1.033 0.97 0.90 0.928 1.01 0.94 0.931
Philippines 1.65 1.65 1.00 0.70 0.64 0.914 1.05 1.08 1.029 1.05 0.97 0.924 1.36 1.25 0.919
Singapore 1.04 1.04 1.00 0.92 0.84 0.913 0.96 0.99 1.031 0.90 0.83 0.922 1.09 1.01 0.927
Thailand 0.83 0.83 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.911 0.97 1.00 1.031 1.04 0.96 0.923 1.06 0.98 0.925
Vietnam 0.57 0.57 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.915 1.08 1.11 1.028 1.28 1.18 0.922 0.72 0.66 0.917
Note: EE_wA—Export Efficiency based on current ACFTA effects; EE_nA—Export Efficiency void of ACFTA; and AEE—Export efficiency (gap) resulting from ACFTA (agreement vs.
no agreement).
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Figure 4. Export Flow of ASEAN Top Nine Exporting Industries (to leading export destinations).
Finally, Table 6 display estimates of export potential for other selected trading partners (Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, and the USA). Results suggest no lasting impacts on export performance for
ASEAN countries. Some exporting nations like Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar (towards the USA)
displayed significant declines across isolated periods (2010); however, both countries rebounded by
2015. By 2018, all member states were exporting at more efficient (or similar) levels. Comparing
export efficiency across the region’s major partners, exports toward the Chinese market is now
amongst the most optimal; ensuring greater stability and importance to the ASEAN-China partnership.
Thus, any increased deviation away from optimal levels (export efficiency values below/above unity)
presents unsustainable long-term challenges. The findings ultimately challenge Tongzon’s [15] and
Devadason’s [5] inferences of a free trade system preventing ASEAN from reaching optimal exports,
thereby restricting their ability to trade effectively with the more developed countries.
Table 6. ASEAN Export Flow Efficiency with other Top Trading Partners (Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,
and USA).
USA Japan
Exporter 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Brunei Darussalam 0.77 0.62 12.74 1.44 0.74 1.14 1.17 0.91 0.93 0.76
Indonesia 1.09 1.10 0.97 0.91 0.93 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.03 0.96
Cambodia 0.69 0.67 0.75 1.35 1.59 3.14 1.53 1.41 0.74 0.72
Lao People’s Dem 1.00 3.79 0.52 1.77 0.71 3.34 3.52 1.41 0.96 0.72
Myanmar 0.30 - 42.63 1.35 1.09 3.13 1.17 0.94 0.72 1.09
Malaysia 1.02 0.83 1.11 1.08 1.08 0.97 1.16 0.95 0.93 1.09
Philippines 0.84 1.10 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.11 1.07 1.08 0.82 0.94
Singapore 0.78 1.02 0.97 1.22 0.97 0.98 1.09 1.10 0.89 0.79
Thailand 0.93 0.99 1.07 0.98 0.98 1.20 1.00 1.02 0.92 0.85
Vietnam 4.25 1.18 0.97 0.94 1.00 0.97 1.02 0.96 0.97 1.16
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Table 6. Cont.
Hong Kong Rep. of Korea
2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018
Brunei Darussalam 5.47 7.28 0.30 0.64 0.47 1.06 1.14 0.91 0.87 1.63
Indonesia 0.91 0.99 0.88 1.21 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.91 1.10 1.10
Cambodia 1.10 0.99 1.10 0.78 0.80 5.46 5.55 1.25 0.81 0.87
Lao People’s Dem 0.63 7.06 0.92 1.21 0.86 1.36 1.74 1.71 0.78 0.75
Myanmar 1.24 0.38 0.78 0.93 0.79 2.73 1.17 0.77 0.79 1.65
Malaysia 1.09 0.92 1.01 1.10 0.67 0.82 1.01 0.99 1.08 1.04
Philippines 1.16 1.13 1.16 1.16 0.82 0.86 1.07 0.89 1.01 1.06
Singapore 1.44 1.12 1.08 0.93 0.81 1.21 1.16 0.97 1.05 1.12
Thailand 1.13 1.08 0.93 1.01 0.98 1.05 1.09 1.11 0.95 0.95
Vietnam 0.95 1.15 0.91 1.04 1.03 1.82 2.24 1.12 1.00 0.78
5. Conclusions
As a benefit, regional associations offer sustainable means for countries to overcome their
shortcomings to reach higher net gains from trade. However, researchers continue to debate the varied
impacts of the ACFTA, noting a significant influence originating from the larger Chinese market. This
study seeks to make rational comparisons between actual and potential export shares, in a pre/post
ACFTA era, deepening the insight into its impact on ASEAN export flow efficiency into China.
Analysis of actual and calculated export potentials, before and following the implementation of the
ACFTA, show that the majority of ASEAN members’ export efficiency to China improved. Deviation
from optimality is only seen within the smaller members—predominantly Brunei Darussalam. At
the level of the industry, the export efficiency for two-thirds of the productions sectors from ASEAN
member countries to China also displayed improvements. As the region’s internal trade draws closer
to its potential, implications are that industries will face greater competition that may question their
survival. Therefore, a prudent step by the governments of ACFTA, particularly the smaller nations,
would be to give greater attention to enhancing the industries that possess a comparative advantage
(extra-regionally) and best utilizes available competitive elements (regionally). The impact of the
ACFTA is expected to benefit the long-run sustainable trade relationship between ASEAN members
and China, therefore increasing their collective bargaining power on the global market.
This study ultimately provides no evidence that supports previous researchers regarding the
ACFTA’s negative impact on ASEAN trade relation with other major destinations. It can be concluded
that during the review period, the ACFTA facilitates the improvement of export optimality for ASEAN
products into China, at no expense to other major destinations. Thus, the long-term sustainability of
the ACFTA for member-nations appears well intact. Notably, any improvement to ACFTA should
include those industries that fail to reap average benefits from the terms, as a primary focus.
To further the understanding of the ASEAN-China relation resulting from ACFTA, extensions to
this research point to an assessment of ACFTA’s tariff and non-tariff segregated implications across
member countries. More specifically, whether the benefits established in this research are channeled
through an increase in the volume of traded items or through an increase in product variations.
According to Lall and Albaladejo, this can eventually lead to regional instability due to increase in
imperfect competition and unbalanced export market share.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Ninety-seven (HS2) Commodity Classifications Used in the Analysis.
Code Product Details Code Product Details Code Product Details
01 Animals; live 34 Soap, organic surface-active agents; washing, lubricating, polishing 67 Feathers & down, prepared; & articles made of feather or ofdown;
02 Meat & edible meat offal 35 Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes 68 Stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials;
03 Fish & crustaceans, molluscs & other aquatic invertebrates 36 Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; 69 Ceramic products
04 Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey; edible prod. of animal origin 37 Photographic or cinematographic goods 70 Glass & glassware
05 Animal originated products; not elsewhere specified or included 38 Chemical products n.e.s. 71 Natural, cultured pearls; prec., semi-precious stones; prec.metals
06 Trees & other plants, live; bulbs, roots & the like 39 Plastics & articles thereof 72 Iron & steel
07 Vegetables & certain roots & tubers; edible 40 Rubber & articles thereof 73 Iron or steel articles
08 Fruit & nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons 41 Raw hides & skins (other than furskins) & leather 74 Copper & articles thereof
09 Coffee, tea, mate & spices 42 Articles of leather; saddlery & harness; travel goods 75 Nickel & articles thereof
10 Cereals 43 Furskins & artificial fur; manufactures thereof 76 Aluminium & articles thereof
11 Products of the milling industry; malt, starches, inulin, wheat gluten 44 Wood & articles of wood; wood charcoal 78 Lead & articles thereof
12 Oilseeds & oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds & fruit, industrial ormedicinal 45 Cork & articles of cork 79 Zinc & articles thereof
13 Lac; gums, resins & other vegetable saps & extracts 46 Manufactures of straw, esparto or other plaiting materials; 80 Tin; articles thereof
14 Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified orincluded 47
Pulp of wood or other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste &
scrap) paper or paperboard 81 Metals; n.e.s., cermets & articles thereof
15 Animal or vegetable fats & oils & their cleavage products; prepared animal fats 48 Paper & paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or paperboard 82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons & forks, of base metal;parts thereof
16 Meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates 49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures, and other printing industryproducts 83 Metal; miscellaneous products of base metal
17 Sugars & sugar confectionery 50 Silk 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanicalappliances;
18 Cocoa & cocoa preparations 51 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn & woven fabric 85 Electrical machinery & equipment & parts thereof
19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks’ products 52 Cotton 86 Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock & parts thereof
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants 53 Vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn & woven fabrics of paper yarn 87 Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, & parts
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 54 Man-made filaments 88 Aircraft, spacecraft & parts thereof
22 Beverages, spirits & vinegar 55 Man-made staple fibres 89 Ships, boats & floating structures
23 Food industries, residues & wastes thereof; prepared animal fodder 56 Wadding, felt & nonwovens, special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes &cables 90
Optical, photo & cinematographic, measuring,
medical/surgical instru
24 Tobacco & manufactured tobacco sub 57 Carpets & other textile floor coverings 91 Clocks & watches & parts thereof
25 Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime & cement 58 Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries 92 Musical instruments; parts & accessories of such articles
26 Ores, slag & ash 59 Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated 93 Arms & ammunition; parts & accessories thereof
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils & products of their distillation 60 Fabrics; knitted or crocheted 94 Furniture; bedding, mattresses, cushions & stuffed furnishing
28 Inorganic chemicals; organic & inorganic compounds 61 Apparel & clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted 95 Toys, games & sports requisites; parts & accessories thereof
29 Organic chemicals 62 Apparel & clothing accessories; not knitted or crocheted 96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
30 Pharmaceutical products 63 Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing & worn textile articles; rags 97 Works of art; collectors’ pieces & antiques
31 Fertilizers 64 Footwear; gaiters & the like; parts of such articles 99 Commodities not specified according to kind
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins & their derivatives 65 Headgear & parts thereof
33 Essential oils & resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations 66 Umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat sticks, whips, riding crops; & partsthereof
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Table A2. OLS Regression Results.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
lnDistance −1.571 *** −1.565 *** −1.554 ***
dContiguity 0.492 *** 0.491 *** 0.492 ***
dLanguage 0.576 *** 0.576 *** 0.581 ***
dColony 1.348 *** 1.348 *** 1.345 ***
dComColony 0.689 *** 0.687 *** 0.683 ***
dGFC −0.0282 *** −0.0278 *** −0.0178 ***
dACFTA 0.0109 0.00755
dACFTA_l1 0.0141
dACFTA_l2 0.0212
dACFTA_l3 −0.0101
dACFTA_l4 −0.100 *
dACFTA_l5 −0.0639
dOFTA 0.764 *** 0.635 ***
dOFTA_l1 0.546 ***
dOFTA_l2 0.617 ***
dOFTA_l3 0.674 ***
dOFTA_l4 0.480 ***
dOFTA_l5 0.464 ***
dPSA −0.497 *** −0.476 ***
dPSA_l1 −0.422 ***
dPSA_l2 −0.508 ***
dPSA_l3 −0.692 ***
dPSA_l4 −0.482 ***
dPSA_l5 −0.401 ***
dCU 1.046 *** 0.620 ***
Constant 18.04 *** 17.98 *** 17.88 ***
(0.00845) (0.00852) (0.00869)
Observations 7,180,409 7,180,409 7,180,409
R-squared 0.691 0.692 0.692
Exporter Industry Time FE YES YES YES
Importer Industry Time FE YES YES YES
Importer Exporter Industry FE No No No
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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Table A3. Results: ASEAN Export Efficiency with China (ranked by 2018 potential exports to China).
Export
Industry Code
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018
EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA
67 0.41 0.41 0.53 0.53 0.26 0.26 0.91 0.93 0.68 0.63 1.31 1.21 5.58 5.15
97 0.72 0.72 0.28 0.28 0.90 0.89 10.53 10.84 2.81 2.59 2.36 2.18 3.10 2.86
45 0.21 0.21 0.48 0.48 0.70 0.69 0.52 0.54 1.68 1.55 3.42 3.16 2.24 2.07
89 61.77 61.77 0.47 0.47 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 12.12 11.19 2.45 2.26 2.08 1.92
37 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.75 0.74 1.32 1.36 2.15 1.98 2.68 2.47 1.92 1.78
79 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.74 1.87 1.85 0.45 0.47 0.97 0.90 0.83 0.76 1.87 1.73
19 1.26 1.26 0.70 0.70 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.63 1.00 0.92 0.97 0.89 1.85 1.71
66 0.84 0.84 2.54 2.54 4.49 4.43 4.37 4.50 2.63 2.43 0.65 0.60 1.84 1.70
51 1.25 1.25 0.42 0.42 0.84 0.83 1.57 1.62 1.52 1.40 0.73 0.67 1.71 1.58
57 1.71 1.71 1.24 1.24 0.36 0.36 0.52 0.54 3.29 3.04 3.29 3.04 1.60 1.48
91 0.78 0.78 0.63 0.63 0.85 0.84 1.18 1.22 0.47 0.43 1.15 1.06 1.54 1.42
70 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.99 0.65 0.67 1.00 0.92 1.23 1.14 1.44 1.33
88 0.63 0.63 1.94 1.94 0.53 0.53 0.91 0.94 1.04 0.96 0.93 0.86 1.38 1.27
82 1.29 1.29 0.80 0.80 0.96 0.95 0.72 0.74 1.51 1.39 1.53 1.41 1.34 1.24
06 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.59 0.61 0.99 0.91 1.64 1.51 1.32 1.22
08 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.97 0.90 1.03 0.95 1.32 1.22
12 0.44 0.44 1.20 1.20 1.34 1.32 0.96 0.99 1.23 1.13 0.97 0.90 1.28 1.19
32 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.92 0.91 1.06 1.09 1.04 0.96 1.03 0.95 1.25 1.16
78 1.56 1.56 1.29 1.29 0.93 0.92 1.33 1.37 0.77 0.71 0.95 0.88 1.25 1.15
68 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.56 0.75 0.74 1.06 1.09 1.02 0.94 1.11 1.03 1.24 1.14
84 1.10 1.10 1.22 1.22 1.03 1.02 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.83 1.08 1.00 1.21 1.12
75 0.75 0.75 0.99 0.99 2.02 2.00 1.61 1.65 0.83 0.77 0.72 0.67 1.20 1.10
63 3.23 3.23 3.37 3.37 1.69 1.66 1.47 1.52 0.73 0.68 0.85 0.79 1.16 1.08
76 0.93 0.93 0.80 0.80 1.31 1.29 0.64 0.66 1.79 1.65 0.72 0.67 1.15 1.06
73 1.22 1.22 1.09 1.09 1.20 1.18 1.36 1.40 1.05 0.97 0.82 0.75 1.15 1.06
44 0.46 0.46 0.59 0.59 1.10 1.09 1.03 1.06 0.93 0.86 1.09 1.01 1.14 1.06
09 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.88 1.05 1.03 0.98 1.01 1.03 0.95 0.99 0.92 1.14 1.06
07 2.58 2.58 0.97 0.97 1.01 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.95 0.88 1.14 1.05
21 1.41 1.41 2.37 2.37 1.52 1.50 1.02 1.05 1.03 0.95 0.91 0.84 1.13 1.04
27 0.72 0.72 0.80 0.80 1.12 1.11 0.92 0.94 1.10 1.02 0.93 0.86 1.09 1.00
24 0.46 0.46 1.07 1.07 0.37 0.36 0.84 0.86 2.00 1.85 1.08 1.00 1.08 1.00
31 26.28 26.28 1.15 1.15 4.32 4.27 0.46 0.47 2.58 2.39 0.67 0.62 1.04 0.96
14 0.81 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.93 0.92 1.22 1.25 0.97 0.90 1.03 0.96 1.04 0.96
50 0.79 0.79 1.43 1.43 0.72 0.71 5.34 5.50 3.43 3.17 0.87 0.80 1.03 0.95
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Table A3. Cont.
Export
Industry Code
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018
EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA
15 0.79 0.79 1.12 1.12 0.82 0.81 1.05 1.09 1.08 1.00 0.96 0.89 1.03 0.95
38 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.98 1.01 1.11 1.02 1.03 0.95 1.02 0.94
40 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.03 1.00 1.03 0.99 0.92 1.01 0.93 1.02 0.94
53 2.62 2.62 1.85 1.85 1.40 1.38 0.78 0.81 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.85 0.99 0.92
26 2.10 2.10 1.83 1.83 1.48 1.46 1.46 1.50 0.76 0.70 1.10 1.02 0.99 0.92
11 1.70 1.70 1.37 1.37 1.08 1.06 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.91
22 1.42 1.42 0.67 0.67 0.74 0.73 0.64 0.66 0.93 0.85 1.42 1.31 0.99 0.91
17 0.92 0.92 1.02 1.02 0.53 0.52 0.91 0.94 0.84 0.78 0.96 0.89 0.97 0.90
41 1.07 1.07 0.65 0.65 0.90 0.89 1.09 1.13 1.13 1.05 1.06 0.98 0.97 0.90
35 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.94 1.08 1.12 1.02 0.94 1.10 1.02 0.97 0.89
01 0.61 0.61 1.57 1.57 0.77 0.76 0.98 1.01 1.62 1.50 1.17 1.08 0.95 0.88
80 1.78 1.78 1.93 1.93 1.68 1.65 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.80 0.96 0.88 0.95 0.88
85 1.38 1.38 1.10 1.10 0.94 0.92 1.01 1.04 0.98 0.91 1.05 0.97 0.94 0.87
90 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.72 1.22 1.26 1.20 1.11 0.97 0.90 0.94 0.87
43 2.34 2.34 25.47 25.47 8.11 8.01 24.61 25.35 2.62 2.42 1.01 0.94 0.94 0.87
18 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.89 1.12 1.16 0.95 0.88 1.13 1.04 0.94 0.87
03 0.49 0.49 1.01 1.01 1.72 1.70 1.34 1.38 1.20 1.10 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.86
30 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.39 0.38 2.12 2.18 1.92 1.77 0.61 0.56 0.93 0.86
64 4.01 4.01 3.21 3.21 1.75 1.73 1.04 1.07 1.04 0.96 0.94 0.87 0.93 0.86
33 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.95 1.51 1.49 1.38 1.42 1.03 0.95 0.95 0.88 0.92 0.85
46 0.75 0.75 0.69 0.69 1.42 1.40 1.05 1.08 0.94 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.92 0.85
29 1.07 1.07 0.88 0.88 0.98 0.97 1.17 1.20 1.05 0.97 1.10 1.01 0.91 0.84
94 1.10 1.10 1.31 1.31 1.40 1.38 1.57 1.62 1.25 1.16 0.78 0.72 0.91 0.84
10 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.06 0.66 0.66 1.21 1.24 1.03 0.95 1.21 1.12 0.89 0.83
54 1.19 1.19 1.15 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.04 1.07 0.92 0.85 0.90 0.83 0.88 0.81
81 0.55 0.55 0.62 0.62 1.40 1.39 1.47 1.52 0.92 0.85 1.50 1.39 0.87 0.80
05 1.49 1.49 1.08 1.08 1.00 0.99 1.27 1.31 1.53 1.42 1.22 1.12 0.85 0.79
28 1.27 1.27 1.72 1.72 1.91 1.89 1.60 1.65 1.81 1.67 0.72 0.66 0.85 0.78
34 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.86 1.16 1.07 0.85 0.78
39 1.13 1.13 1.02 1.02 1.17 1.15 1.14 1.17 1.01 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.84 0.78
48 0.54 0.54 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.75 1.19 1.23 1.45 1.34 1.85 1.71 0.83 0.77
47 0.52 0.52 0.86 0.86 0.98 0.97 1.08 1.12 1.25 1.16 1.05 0.97 0.83 0.77
59 1.45 1.45 1.10 1.10 1.00 0.99 1.13 1.17 1.02 0.94 1.12 1.04 0.82 0.76
52 0.72 0.72 1.00 1.00 2.46 2.43 1.11 1.14 1.47 1.36 0.87 0.80 0.81 0.75
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Table A3. Cont.
Export
Industry Code
2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018
EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA EE_wA EE_nA
56 2.62 2.62 1.14 1.14 1.27 1.26 1.30 1.34 0.89 0.82 1.09 1.01 0.80 0.74
61 3.36 3.36 2.51 2.51 3.03 2.99 1.93 1.99 1.11 1.03 0.85 0.79 0.80 0.74
92 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.21 1.20 2.30 2.37 1.10 1.01 0.81 0.75 0.80 0.73
62 2.58 2.58 3.95 3.95 3.07 3.03 1.87 1.93 1.09 1.01 0.88 0.81 0.80 0.73
83 1.09 1.09 0.94 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.72 0.74 1.12 1.03 0.89 0.82 0.79 0.73
42 1.80 1.80 2.45 2.45 1.38 1.37 1.40 1.45 1.53 1.41 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.72
95 2.05 2.05 1.16 1.16 0.35 0.34 0.97 1.00 2.85 2.64 0.93 0.86 0.78 0.72
74 0.65 0.65 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.79 1.31 1.35 1.40 1.29 1.18 1.09 0.76 0.70
86 1.30 1.30 17.66 17.66 1.94 1.91 2.64 2.72 2.58 2.38 0.90 0.83 0.73 0.67
23 0.67 0.67 1.41 1.41 1.10 1.08 1.13 1.16 1.05 0.97 1.31 1.21 0.73 0.67
96 3.79 3.79 2.82 2.82 0.87 0.85 1.42 1.46 0.91 0.84 0.79 0.73 0.72 0.67
16 1.13 1.13 1.77 1.77 2.57 2.54 1.61 1.66 2.37 2.19 1.08 0.99 0.72 0.66
58 1.77 1.77 2.34 2.34 1.19 1.18 0.97 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.63 0.58 0.71 0.66
55 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.95 1.20 1.24 1.20 1.11 0.95 0.88 0.71 0.66
87 0.51 0.51 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.82 1.27 1.31 1.32 1.21 1.03 0.95 0.71 0.65
71 1.01 1.01 0.66 0.66 1.06 1.05 1.74 1.80 3.93 3.63 0.73 0.67 0.70 0.65
20 0.93 0.93 1.99 1.99 1.31 1.29 1.66 1.71 1.35 1.24 1.00 0.92 0.70 0.64
65 1.98 1.98 0.97 0.97 2.10 2.07 2.26 2.33 0.87 0.80 1.37 1.27 0.65 0.60
69 1.57 1.57 1.55 1.55 1.63 1.61 0.94 0.96 1.17 1.08 1.05 0.97 0.65 0.60
13 1.62 1.62 1.04 1.04 1.35 1.33 1.48 1.53 1.27 1.17 0.85 0.78 0.64 0.59
60 2.85 2.85 1.50 1.50 1.18 1.17 1.61 1.66 1.53 1.42 1.12 1.04 0.62 0.57
49 3.78 3.78 4.72 4.72 3.17 3.13 2.00 2.06 1.07 0.99 0.60 0.55 0.62 0.57
04 1.66 1.66 0.46 0.46 1.64 1.62 1.47 1.51 2.96 2.73 0.87 0.80 0.58 0.54
02 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 1.98 1.96 1.19 1.22 3.02 2.79 1.74 1.60 0.57 0.53
72 1.01 1.01 0.80 0.80 1.85 1.83 1.66 1.71 1.82 1.68 1.13 1.04 0.56 0.52
25 1.11 1.11 0.90 0.90 1.06 1.04 0.93 0.96 2.07 1.91 1.28 1.18 0.55 0.51
36 2.14 2.14 0.61 0.61 0.90 0.89 1.88 1.94 1.71 1.58 0.97 0.90 0.49 0.45
93 22.19 22.19 0.59 0.59 0.65 0.65 43.99 45.32 13.19 12.18 4.27 3.95 0.04 0.04
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Appendix B
A DID analysis and decomposition of ACFTA’s impacts for importers and exporters as follow:
From the gravity model we have
Xi j =
(
τi j
ΠiP j
)1−δ(YiY j
Yw
)
(A1)
where
Πi =
 N∑
j=1
(θ j/τi jσ−1)P j1−σ

1/(1−σ)
(A2)
P j =
[∑N
i=1
(θi/τi jσ−1)Πi1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
(A3)
θi denotes Yi/Yw, that is the share of country i’s GDP relative to all the countries. Πi and Pj are
usually known as multilateral resistance. Πi is the outward multilateral resistance which measures
how difficult for country i to export goods relative to the rest of the world. Pj is the inward multilateral
resistance that measures how difficult for country j to import goods relative to the rest of the world.
The overall margin (OM) are defined as follow. Here, Xwj represents all the countries export to
country j.
OMij =
Xij
Xwj
=
(
τij
ΠiPj
)1−δ(YiYj
Yw
)
1
Xwj
(A4)
Following Baier and Bergstrand‘s method to linearly approximate the multilateral resistances
noted in (Equations (A5) and (A6)). They are presented as:
ln(Πit) =
[∑N
j=1
θj ln
(
τijt
)
− 1
2
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθm ln(τkm)
]
(A5)
ln(Pjt) =
[∑N
i=1
θi ln
(
τijt
)
− 1
2
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθm ln(τkmt)
]
(A6)
The two-stage estimation is as follows:
First stage:
ln(OMijt) = αo0 + βo1 ln
(
dij
)
+ βo2·gij + δo·tariffijt +ϕo1Iit +ϕo2Ijt + ε(om)ijt (A7)
Thus, the regression in the second stage for exporters is as follows:
ϕo1Iit = αoi + βoi1ln
(
dij
)
+ βoi2borderij + βoi3langij + βoi4tariffijt + γoinontariffit+
ϕoi1 ln(Yit) +ϕoi2 ln(Ywt) + µ(om)it
(A8)
The second stage for importers is as follow:
ϕo2Ijt = αoj + βoj1 l˜n
(
dij
)
+ βoj2˜borderij + βoj3 l˜angij + βoj4 t˜ariffijt + γojnontariffjt
+ϕoj1 ln
(
Yjt
)
+ϕoj2 ln(Ywt) + µ(om)jt
(A9)
where:
ln
(
dij
)
=
[∑N
j=1
θj ln
(
dij
)
− 1
2
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθm ln(dkm)
]
(A10)
borderij =
[∑N
j=1
θjborderij − 12
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθmborderkm
]
(A11)
langij =
[∑N
j=1
θjlangij −
1
2
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθmlangkm
]
(A12)
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tariffijt =
[∑N
j=1
θjtariffijt − 12
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθmtariffkmt
]
(A13)
l˜n
(
dij
)
=
[∑N
i=1
θi ln
(
dij
)
− 1
2
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθm ln(dkm)
]
(A14)
˜borderij =
[∑N
i=1
θiborderij − 12
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθmborderkm
]
(A15)
l˜angij =
[∑N
i=1
θilangij −
1
2
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθmlangkm
]
(A16)
t˜ariffijt =
[∑N
i=1
θitariffijt − 12
∑N
k=1
∑N
m=1
θkθmtariffkmt
]
. (A17)
There will be two effects for ACFTA via DID approach: First is the tariff effect, which will be
presented in stage one. Another is the non-tariff effect, which is in stage two.
Results are as follows:
Table A4. Stage I—Aggregate impact on ASEAN-China bilateral margins.
Variables Overall Margin
Tariff (average) −0.0238 **
(0.0115)
ln(Distance) −0.639 ***
(0.0190)
Contiguity 0.800 ***
(0.0186)
Common Language 0.0710 ***
(0.0249)
Shard WTO membership
(0.111)
Observations 82,905
R-squared 0.865
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Table A5. Stage II ACFTA’s impact for exporters.
Dep. var.:_Iit (A1) (B1)
Exporter-year coefficients OM OM
acfta_Trade in Goods 0.0365 −0.0401
(0.0837) (0.0838)
acfta_Dispute Settlement −0.0405 −0.0733
(0.0911) (0.0924)
acfta_2nd Protocol to Amend TiG 0.124 0.136
(0.128) (0.125)
acfta_Protocol for Technical Barriers −0.0727 0.0224
(0.0740) (0.0745)
acfta_Protocol for Trade facilitation 0.0115 0.0360
(0.0602) (0.0608)
Global Financial Crisis 0.207 ** 0.270 ***
(0.0907) (0.0905)
Importers’ GDP share weighted tariff −0.128 0.164
(0.118) (0.115)
Importers’ GDP share weighted language 0.00439 0.00158
(0.0105) (0.0104)
Importers’ GDP share weighted contiguity 0.0115 ** 0.0162 ***
(0.0052) (0.0052)
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Table A5. Cont.
Dep. var.:_Iit (A1) (B1)
Exporter-year coefficients OM OM
Importers’ GDP share weighted ln(distance) −0.501 −1.180 *
(0.614) (0.642)
Importers’ GDP share weighted WTO members −0.0020 ***
(0.0003)
ln(sample World’s GDP) −0.920 −1.884 **
(0.789) (0.809)
ln(Exporter’s GDP) 0.646 1.635 *
(0.821) (0.848)
Constant 9.492 16.45 *
(8.716) (8.845)
Observations 19,943 19,918
R-squared 0.217 0.232
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
Table A6. Stage II ACFTA’s impact on importers.
Dep. var.: _Ijt (A1) (B1)
Importer-year coefficients OM OM
acfta_Trade in Goods −0.164 *** −0.161 ***
(0.0346) (0.0347)
acfta_Dispute Settlement −0.00979 −0.00417
(0.0378) (0.0385)
acfta_2nd Protocol to Amend TiG −0.185 *** −0.107 **
(0.0402) (0.0447)
acfta_Protocol for Technical Barriers −0.00281 −0.0163
(0.0298) (0.0304)
acfta_Protocol for Trade facilitation 0.122 *** 0.0849 ***
(0.0229) (0.0239)
Global Financial Crisis −0.121 *** −0.105 ***
(0.0344) (0.0349)
Importers’ GDP share weighted tariff 0.00889 0.271 ***
(0.0376) (0.0513)
Importers’ GDP share weighted language −0.00319 0.000557
(0.00201) (0.00204)
Importers’ GDP share weighted contiguity 0.00654 *** 0.000142
(0.00128) (0.00197)
Importers’ GDP share weighted ln(distance) 0.0677 −0.273
(0.152) (0.171)
Importers’ GDP share weighted WTO members 0.00226 ***
(0.000621)
ln(sample World’s GDP) 0.396 0.545 **
(0.241) (0.257)
ln(Exporter’s GDP) −0.177 −0.344
(0.276) (0.303)
Constant −5.838 *** −3.664 **
(1.712) (1.722)
Observations 22,590 22,553
R-squared 0.070 0.093
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
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In the second stage, ACFTA denotes variables for Trade in Goods, Dispute Settlement, 2nd Protocol
to Amendment, Protocol for Technical Barriers, and Protocol for Trade facilitation. Those are dummy
variables which represent various stages of progression regarding the ACFTA.
In stage one, we can see a direct effect caused by cutting tariff via ACFTA in Table A4, where a 1%
decline in tariff will increase the trade by 2.4%. In stage two, Tables A5 and A6 present the non-tariff
effects for exports and imports. The reason for insignificant of the coefficients is due to requiring further
decomposition into extensive and intensive margins of trade (which will lead to the opposite effect in
two margins and cancel with each other; hence, with insignificant results on overall margins). That
requires another decomposition of Tables A5 and A6 into the extensive margin and intensive margin.
The above represents adjoin empirical results to this paper. However, such an assessment will be
developed in another paper, as this is beyond the scope of this particular study.
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